The Judiciary\u27s Bicentennial by Meltzer, Daniel J.
ARTICLES
The Judiciary's Bicentennial
Daniel J. Meltzert
It is no easy task to set the stage for a scholarly commemora-
tion of the two hundredth anniversary of the First Judiciary Act.
Few of us are familiar with the entire scope of today's federal judi-
ciary. Territorially, it extends across the continent and even half-
way around the world.' It reaches into diverse areas-patents, civil
rights, bankruptcy, Indian Claims, federal administrative review in
all of its variety, the sentencing of federal criminals-some of
which must baffle even the most catholic of legal imaginations. Its
proceedings vary from the nonadversarial (naturalizing citizens or
issuing search warrants) to the traditional (resolving private diver-
sity cases) to the dramatic (formulating institutional decrees). And
its impact-on private conduct, on governmental institutions, and
on public attitudes-is at once great and unmeasurable.
It is harder still to envision the judicial world established on
September 24, 1789, when President Washington signed the first
Judiciary Act 2-not so much because the original national judici-
ary was more limited in size or scope, but rather because it was so
different in conception from today's federal bench. The very deci-
sion to authorize establishment of "inferior" federal courts was
controversial at the Constitutional Convention 4 and during the rat-
t Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. I am grateful to Matt Roberts, Class of 1989,
Harvard Law School, for very helpful comments and research assistance.
' See, for example, 48 USC § 1694 (1982) (establishing the District Court for the North-
ern Mariana Islands).
2 Charles Warren, 1 The Supreme Court in United States History 33 (Little, Brown,
1922).
3 See US Const, Art III, § 1, vesting the judicial power in one Supreme Court and "such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."
4 See Paul M. Bator, et al, Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal
System 10-11 (Foundation, 3d ed 1988) ("Hart & Wechsler").
The University of Chicago Law Review
ification debates.5 When the first Congress debated the judiciary
bill, Fisher Ames, a representative from Massachusetts, noted to a
friend that "[t]he question whether we shall have inferior federal
tribunals (except Admiralty Courts, which were not denied to be
necessary) was very formidably contested."'
The Senate had a somewhat more generous vision of the fed-
eral judiciary, and in the end that vision prevailed. Still, the dis-
trict and circuit courts ordained by the first Judiciary Act were of
quite limited powers, lacking what today would be viewed as their
core jurisdiction in federal question cases.7 Furthermore, the struc-
ture of the original court system was flawed in conception and
hence problematic from the outset. The circuit courts lacked
judges of their own, and instead were staffed by district judges and
Justices of the Supreme Court riding circuit.8 The circuit riding
chores were burdensome and at times downright impossible to dis-
charge; small improvements in transportation were outstripped by
large increases in the size of the circuits to be covered.9 Though a
district judge, when sitting on a circuit court, could not vote on an
appeal from his own decision, 10 no similar provision prevented a
Supreme Court Justice from voting on an appeal from a circuit
court decision in which he had participated.
The Supreme Court established by the First Judiciary Act is
far more familiar, but to the modern eye there are oddities besides
the Justices' circuit riding duties. For those of us raised in an era
of vote counting and five-four divisions, a Court with an even num-
ber of Justices (six) is itself unusual.1 And at a time when the
Court is generally viewed as the pinnacle of the profession, it is
sobering to recall that John Jay, the first Chief Justice, resigned in
1795 to become Governor of New York,1 2 as Justice Rutledge had
resigned in 1791, without ever sitting, to become Chief Justice of
the South Carolina Supreme Court."3
The federal courts have come a long way in 200 years. And in
' See id at 21-22.
' Carl McGowan, The Organization of Judicial Power in the United States 24 (North-
western U, 1969). See also Charles Warren, New Light on the Federal Judiciary Act of
1789, 37 Harv L Rev 49, 66-68, 119-127 (1923).
Warren, 37 Harv L Rev at 131 (cited in note 6).
8 Warren, 1 Supreme Court at 58 (cited in note 2).
9 Id at 86-89; Felix Frankfurter and James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme
Court 34-37 (MacMillan, 1928).
'0 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch 20, § 4, 1 Stat 74-75.
" Judiciary Act of 1789, ch 20, § 1, 1 Stat 73.
12 See Warren, 1 Supreme Court at 124 (cited in note 2).
" See id at 56-57.
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marking an occasion like this one, some reflections on their evolu-
tion may help us in thinking about what lies ahead.
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
The business of the federal judiciary has changed dramatically
in two centuries. The least controversial part of the original juris-
diction granted to the inferior courts was in admiralty, 4 which to-
day comprises only 2 percent of federal cases 15 and is terra incog-
nita for most lawyers, even those whose practice revolves around
the federal courts. The other important original jurisdictions were
in diversity and federal criminal cases; the former, narrowed even
before it was enacted,1 has long been a source of controversy. 7
A sea change in the structure of federal jurisdiction was set in
motion during the ten years following the Civil War. This period
witnessed the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the exten-
sion of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction to state prisoners,8 the
enactment of federal civil rights statutes enforceable in the federal
courts (most notably the Civil Rights Act of 1871, the progenitor of
42 USC § 1983), 1 and finally, in 1875, the vesting of a general fed-
eral question jurisdiction in the federal courts.20 The shift was sub-
stantive-involving the creation of new federal rights-as well as
jurisdictional.
To be sure, it took quite some time for the full effects to be
felt; more than half of the Seventh Circuit's opinions between 1892
and 1911, for example, were written in diversity cases.2' But the
influx of cases enforcing federal law, once begun, was not to be
turned back, and indeed it accelerated in the twentieth century.2
The nearly complete incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the
11 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch 20, § 9, 1 Stat 77; Federalist 80 (Hamilton), in Clinton
Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers 475, 478 (Mentor, 1961).
" See Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 182 (Harvard, 1985).
16 The original proposal in Congress extended to all suits between citizens of different
states; section 11 of the First Judiciary Act was limited to suits in which one of the parties
was a citizen of the state in which the suit was brought. Compare Charles Warren, 37 Harv
L Rev at 79 (cited in note 6), with Judiciary Act of 1789, ch 20, § 11, 1 Stat 78.
17 For an introduction to the debate, see Hart & Wechsler at 1695-1700 and sources
cited note 1 (cited in note 4).
"8 Act of February 5, 1867, ch 27, 14 Stat 385.
19 See generally Theodore Eisenberg, Civil Rights Legislation: Cases and Materials 3-4
(Michie, 2d ed 1987).
20 Act of March 3, 1875, ch 137, §§ 1-2, 18 Stat 470-71 (Part 3).
" See Rayman L. Solomon, The Politics of Appointment and the Federal Courts' Role
in Regulating America: U.S. Courts of Appeals Judgeships from T.R. to F.D.R., 1984 Am B
Found Res J 285, 301.
22 Id.
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Fourteenth Amendment, the expansive interpretation of the § 1983
cause of action,23 the elimination of any jurisdictional amount
under § 1331 (the statute conferring general federal question juris-
diction),24 the judicial creation of implied rights of action,25 the
rise of the federal administrative state, and more generally the
burgeoning of federal statutory law-these developments have con-
tributed to the transformation of the federal courts into tribunals
concerned primarily with federal statutory and constitutional law.
More has changed than the dockets of federal judges. A new
conception of the relationship between citizen and national judici-
ary has evolved. In admiralty and diversity cases, the federal
courts play a structural role; only a national judiciary is competent
to administer a body of doctrine with international ramifications,
or to serve as a neutral arbiter in disputes where in-state favorit-
ism might be feared.28 But today the federal courts are an active
instrument of federal substantive policy; they have become, in
Frankfurter and Landis's much-quoted phrase, "the primary and
powerful reliances for vindicating every right given by the Consti-
tution, the laws, and treaties of the United States."2 7
These substantive rights, could, in theory, have been enforced
without federal question jurisdiction-by Supreme Court interpre-
tations that the state courts would have been obliged to follow. But
as Judge McGowan has noted, it is difficult to believe that a deci-
sion like Brown v Board of Education28 would have been meaning-
fully enforced absent a machinery of lower federal courts.29 Much
the same could be said of the reapportionment decisions, the myr-
23 See generally Hart & Wechsler at 1229-77 (cited in note 4); Eisenberg, Civil Rights
Legislation at 55-117 (cited in note 19).
2, Act of Dec 1, 1980, Pub L No 96-486, 94 Stat 2369, codified at 28 USC § 1331 (1982).
25 See Hart & Wechsler at 917-50 (cited in note 4).
16 This posits the conventional historical explanation for diversity jurisdiction-to pro-
tect out-of-state litigants from local bias. See Bank of the United States v DeVeaux, 9 US
(5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809); Warren, 37 Harv L Rev at 83 (cited in note 6). Compare Henry J.
Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 Harv L Rev 483, 495-97 (1928),
arguing that the constitutional and statutory grants of jurisdiction were motivated not by
generalized fear of local prejudice, but rather by a more focused desire to protect creditors
from debtor relief laws enacted by state legislatures.
11 Frankfurter and Landis, Business of the Supreme Court at 65 (cited in note 9). In-
deed, the meaning of Tocqueville's observation that "[s]carcely any political question arises
in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question," Alexis de
Tocqueville, 1 Democracy in America 280 (Knopf, 1945), has almost been transformed by
wearisome repetition-from an observation of something remarkable to a statement of the
obvious.
28 347 US 483 (1954).
29 See McGowan, Judicial Power at 14-16 (cited in note 6).
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iad constitutional regulations of criminal procedure, and other con-
troversial matters.
If Swift v Tyson 0 was an effort to make the federal courts a
force for the rationalization and nationalization of judge-made
law,31 we all know that it had failed long before Justice Brandeis
wrote its obituary in Erie Railroad Co. v Tompkins. 2 But today's
federal judiciary has become a quite different kind of nationalizing
force, developing federal statutory and constitutional law and per-
haps emboldening the Supreme Court and the political branches to
exert federal authority because they know that the lower federal
courts stand ready to provide support.
The federal judiciary has also been a nationalizing force in two
more mundane ways. The first is through the various rules of pro-
cedure promulgated by the Supreme Court, which have been
widely influential in the states." The second is through the con-
centration on federal law in the curricula of most law schools.
Courses in civil and criminal procedure, constitutional law, evi-
dence, administrative law, and income taxation (to mention only a
few) are generally courses in federal law. Even in subjects like torts
or contracts, federal decisions are featured far out of proportion to
their number."' Insofar as modern lawyers have a common intellec-
tual heritage, the federal courts are its primary source. This devel-
opment, too, would have been hard to foresee in 1789.
2. JUDGES AND BUREAUCRATS
The title given this symposium-The Federal Court Sys-
tem-might have seemed a bit grand in 1789. The original judici-
ary, after all, had only a few judges, fledgling courts (some of which
lacked regular judges altogether), and precious little else. Almost a
century passed before Justice Gray hired the first law clerk, and
30 41 US (16 Pet) 1 (1842).
31 See, for example, Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-
1860 255 (Harvard, 1977); William P. LaPiana, Swift v. Tyson and the Brooding Omnipres-
ence in the Sky: An Investigation of the Idea of Law in Antebellum America, 20 Suffolk U
L Rev 771, 830 (1986).
32 304 US 64 (1938).
33 See, for example, Walter Cox and David Newbern, New Civil Procedure: The Court
That Came in from the Code, 33 Ark L Rev 1, 2 n 6 (1979); Vincent L. McKusick, State
Courts' Interest in Federal Rulemaking: A Proposal for Recognition, 36 Me L Rev 253, 253-
55 (1984); Michael E. Solimine and James L. Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal
and State Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10 Hastings Const L Q 213,
227 n 72 and sources cited therein (1983).
34 See Posner, The Federal Courts at 144 (cited in note 15).
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the practice was not regularized until the 1930s.35 The title is more
apt today in describing a branch of government that has a billion
dollar budget, close to 20,000 employees, training sessions, conven-
tions, and all the other modern trappings of organizational life.36
In some sense, a lawyer today encounters the federal judiciary
rather than federal judges. Two centuries ago it was far easier to
envision a judge as an individual man (as then they all were) who
brought to bear on each dispute a judgment neither mechanical
nor arbitrary, but reasoned and wise. Today cases are processed
not simply by Article III judges, but by law clerks and staff attor-
neys, magistrates, and masters. Judges lament that they have be-
come paper-pushers, while some observers lament that judges have
become case managers and mediators (often forceful ones) rather
than adjudicators.3 The courts of appeals are not immune from
these changes. In some circuits, oral argument is the exception, not
the rule, and a staff attorney who deems an appeal routine may
prepare a draft opinion even before any of the judges has opened
the briefs. 8
An opinion by Marshall or Holmes or Cardozo has the unmis-
takable voice of that Justice.39 Hence, Brandeis's remark that
"[t]he reason the public thinks so much of the Justices of the Su-
preme Court is that they . . .do their own work. '40 Though the
comment still has some force today, it does not resonate as clearly
as it did when uttered more than half a century ago. Judge Posner
has described the increase in opinion writing by law clerks, and
how it has homogenized prose and stylized argumentation.41 Such
delegation may be inevitable for all but the most efficient of fed-
3S J. Daniel Mahoney, Foreword-Law Clerks: For Better or for Worse?, 54 Brooklyn L
Rev 321, 323, 325 (1988).
36 The budget authority of the judiciary was $1.2 billion in fiscal year 1987. See Admin-
istrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 1987 Annual Report of the Director 46-47 (Table 17). Of
a total of 19,352 judiciary employees in 1987, only about 5 percent were judges. See id at 48-
49 (Table 19).
37 See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 Harv L Rev 374 (1982).
" Joe S. Cecil and Donna Stienstra, Deciding Cases Without Argument: An Examina-
tion of Four Courts of Appeals 20, 93-94 (Federal Judicial Center, 1987).
" Even a lesser figure might have a distinctive style. Consider, for example, this sen-
tence from Berger v United States, 255 US 22, 43 (1921) (McReynolds dissenting): "[W]hile
'An overspeaking Judge is no well tuned cymbal' neither is an amorphous dummy unspotted
by human emotions a becoming receptacle for judicial power." One would not confuse this
prose with great literature, but neither would one wonder whether it was drafted by the
Justice or his law clerk.
40 See Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., Whereas-A Judge's Premises 61 (Little, Brown,
1965).
41 See Posner, The Federal Courts at 102-19 (cited in note 15).
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eral judges, but in this case necessity is the mother of convention,
and an unappealing convention at that.
And so, as the federal judiciary has come of age, its character
and organization as well as its docket have changed dramatically.42
3. THE SUPREME COURT, OLD AND NEW
The changes in the Supreme Court's role are just as dramatic
as those in the role of the lower courts. In 1988, just one year shy
of its bicentennial, the Supreme Court completed a transformation
that had begun nearly a hundred years earlier-to a court with
complete discretion in the selection of its caseload.43
Although the driving force behind this change-concern about
the Court's workload-is painfully familiar today, it has not always
been present; Chief Justice Rehnquist reminds us that in 1824, the
Court sat in Washington for only six weeks a year.44 But by the
time the country was celebrating the centennial of the Constitu-
tion, Chief Justice Waite was calling for a reduction in the Court's
appellate jurisdiction." Waite's concern was well-founded, as a
burgeoning case load was smothering the Supreme Court (and the
federal courts generally). 46 The Evarts Act of 189147 did more than
provide much needed relief for the Court. It provided a judicial
structure that facilitated the transformation of the Supreme Court,
both by creating Circuit Courts of Appeals, in which an appeal of
right could be heard, and by introducing, on a limited basis, the
principle of discretionary review via writ of certiorari in the Su-
preme Court.48 The scope of that principle expanded over time un-
til, last year, the remaining limits on it were cast aside.49
This shift may be administratively necessary, and in that
sense desirable, but it raises important questions about the role of
41 See generally id at 59-129; Wade H. McCree, Jr., Bureaucratic Justice: An Early
Warning, 129 U Pa L Rev 777 (1981); Alvin B. Rubin, Bureaucratization of the Federal
Courts: The Tension Between Justice and Efficiency, 55 Notre Dame Lawyer 648 (1980).
" Well, not quite complete. For the tiny areas of mandatory appellate jurisdiction that
remain, see Bennett Boskey and Eugene Gressman, The Supreme Court Bids Farewell to
Mandatory Appeals, 109 S Ct lxxxi, xcvii (1988).
" William H. Rehnquist, The Changing Role of the Supreme Court, 14 Fla St U L Rev
1, 2 (1986). He notes that the Justices were required to ride Circuit as well. Id.
" See Hampton Carson, ed, 2 History of the Celebration of the One Hundredth Anni-
versary of the Promulgation of the Constitution of the United States 313-14 (1889).
" See Frankfurter and Landis, Business of the Supreme Court at 60, 69 (cited in note9).
9) Act of March 3, 1891, ch 517, 26 Stat 826.
48 Id § 6, 26 Stat 828.
" Pub L No 100-352, 102 Stat 662 (1988).
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the national judiciary and of its highest court. One is a question of
federalism. A range of statutory and judge-made rules that virtu-
ally eliminate plenary federal adjudication of federal issues in
cases to which they apply-for example, the Johnson Act of 1934,0
the Tax Injunction Act of 1937,51 the equitable restraint doctrine
of Younger v Harris52 -came into existence at a time when many
federal rightholders, if they did not prevail in state court, had the
right to appellate review by the Supreme Court. 3 Just as in 1789 it
was argued that original federal court jurisdiction was unnecessary
because of the availability of Supreme Court review of state court
judgments,54 the unavailability today of Supreme Court review (as
of right) may call for reconsideration of these limits on federal dis-
trict court jurisdiction.
A second question-is how this shift affects the Court's adjudi-
cation of particular cases. There has always been a tension-some
would call it a creative one-involved in deciding concrete contro-
versies in accordance with generalizable principles. But a court
that selects its business solely for the purpose of settling issues of
national importance may be especially likely to write its opinions
for that same purpose-rather than simply to address those legal
questions whose decision is necessary to resolve the dispute be-
tween the parties.55
It is time for the Supreme Court to acknowledge that its per-
spective on adjudication differs sharply from that of the lower fed-
eral courts, whose jurisdiction is obligatory. The Miranda deci-
sion,56 for example, was quite clearly an effort by the Supreme
Court to "solve" the problem of police interrogation; indeed, the
facts of the cases under review are not even mentioned until the
eighteenth page of the opinion. 7 Whatever the merits of Miranda,
it is difficult to imagine a federal district court writing an opinion
of that kind. The Supreme Court's approach to adjudication
should be viewed not as a model for the lower courts, but instead
as an adaptation to the quite different jurisdiction that now ex-
-0 28 USC § 1342 (1982).
51 28 USC § 1341 (1982).
52 401 US 37 (1971).
" The right to an appeal extended to challenges on federal grounds to the validity of a
state or local statute. See Hart & Wechsler at 502-03, 721-22 (cited in note 4).
'4 See, for example, Warren, 37 Harv L Rev at 65 (cited in note 6).
See generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Participation, Responsiveness, and the Con-
sultative Process: An Essay for Lon Fuller, 92 Harv L Rev 410, 431 (1978).
" Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966).
57 Id at 456.
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tends across its entire docket.
4. FEDERAL COURTS AND STATE COURTS: THE ALLOCATION OF
JURISDICTION
The federal judiciary can be viewed as merely one part of a
system of American courts, federal and state, within which particu-
lar cases are distributed to the tribunals of one or another jurisdic-
tion. Within that larger system, it is sometimes said that the fed-
eral courts dispense a "juster justice.""8 That proposition is
controversial, 9 and in the Supreme Court's view any claim of a
right to federal court adjudication can have only a statutory, not a
constitutional, basis.60 But to whatever extent one agrees with the
proposition, it raises a vexing question: who deserves a juster
justice?
A simple answer is that, at a minimum, parties with federal
questions belong in federal court. The prevalence of that view to-
day is another indication of how far our conception of the federal
judiciary has changed since 1789. But that view collides with a con-
temporary reality-federal judges, though their numbers have in-
creased significantly in the past three decades,61 are straining
58 The phrase was used by Henry Hart to refer to a federal court sitting in diversity, see
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum L Rev 489,
513 (1954), but it has been used since in a more general fashion. See, for example, Henry J.
Friendly, Federal Jurisdiction: A General View 12 (Columbia, 1973).
59 For a recent survey of the complexities buried in the question whether there is "par-
ity" between state and federal courts, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defin-
ing A Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L Rev 233 (1988).
"0 See generally Hart & Wechsler at 382 (cited in note 4). I do not ignore, but I have
not quite been persuaded by, arguments that the Constitution mandates the establishment
of some federal court jurisdiction (original or appellate) over constitutional cases, see Law-
rence Gene Sager, Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regu-
late the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 Harv L Rev 17, 44 (1981), or more broadly,
over the "subject matter" categories of Article III, Section 2-federal question and admi-
ralty cases and cases affecting ambassadors, see Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of
Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 BU L Rev 205, 218-19
(1985). In any event, these arguments accept (albeit at times grudgingly) the Supreme
Court's certiorari jurisdiction as a sufficient vesting of the judicial power. See id at 267-68
(certiorari does not violate "the letter of Article III," though the Court's "practical inabil-
ity" to review most cases "seems at war with the spirit of Article III"); Sager, 95 Harv L Rev
at 52-57. Accordingly, they do not call into question the constitutionality of restrictions on
original federal question jurisdiction. The still broader argument that Article III requires
the vesting of original or appellate jurisdiction over every case within the scope of Article III
(excepting perhaps matters deemed trivial) also accepts discretionary review as adequate
vesting of the judicial power. Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Juris-
diction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U Pa L Rev 741,
749-53 (1984).
"1 The number of circuit court of appeals judgeships has increased from 68 in 1960 to
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under caseloads that have increased far more quickly.2 And as
others have persuasively argued, there are serious institutional and
administrative costs to increasing either the number of district and
appellate judges or the number of support personnel.0 Article III
justice is a limited commodity, and its distinctive quality is in
some jeopardy of dilution.
Moreover, the simple answer is not so simple. As Henry Hart
so famously explained, "[f]ederal law is generally interstitial in its
nature," and "frequently in litigation federal law bears only par-
tially upon the case."64 Though pleas for expanded removal based
on federal defenses have been made-particularly when the de-
fendant seeks removal65-the generally satisfactory experience
without such removal jurisdiction must dominate the logic of equal
treatment for defendants and plaintiffs. 6 State court decisions in
key areas in which civil defendants raise defenses-such as lack of
personal jurisdiction, or First Amendment defenses in defamation
actions-have not, to my knowledge, raised general doubts about
the sympathy or ability of state courts in dealing with these claims.
The same statement is harder to make about state criminal cases,
but federal constitutional questions are so pervasive in those cases
that a removal jurisdiction could lead to a wholesale federal as-
sumption of the administration of state criminal justice. Federal
injunctive relief and habeas corpus are far more surgical ways of
extending federal jurisdiction to federal issues in state criminal
cases. 6 7 And in any event, now is hardly the time for an experiment
that could significantly increase the workload of the federal courts.
As our national courts enter their third century, the commit-
168 today. See 28 USC § 44(a) (Supp IV 1986); Posner, The Federal Courts at 99 (cited in
note 15).
62 See the thorough discussion in Posner, The Federal Courts at 59-129 (cited in note
15).
63 See, for example, id at 94-129; McCree, 129 U Pa L Rev at 782-85 (cited in note 42).
There may also be constitutional limits on the use of supporting personnel like magistrates.
See, for example, United States v Garcia, 848 F2d 1324, 1329-32 (2d Cir 1988), cert granted
sub nom Gomez v United States, 109 S Ct 782 (1989).
64 See Hart & Wechsler at 533 (cited in note 4). See generally Hart, 54 Colum L Rev
489 (cited in note 58).
11 See, for example, American Law Institute, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Be-
tween State and Federal Courts 188-203 (ALI, 1969).
66 Judge Posner has doubted the case for symmetry, stressing that defendants have a
greater incentive to raise frivolous federal defenses in order to delay. See Posner, The Fed-
eral Courts at 190 (cited at note 15). For a skeptical response, see Martin Redish, Federal
Courts: Cases, Comments and Questions 481 (West, 2d ed 1989).
6 See Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 Wm
& Mary L Rev 605, 611-21 (1981).
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ments they have undertaken have again placed the system under
great strain, much as was true in the last part of the nineteenth
century. Many of today's cries about workload might seem to give
some credence to the fears of Senator Maclay who, in voting
against the First Judiciary Act, characterized it as creating a "sys-
tem ... with a design to draw by degrees all law business into the
Federal Courts."6 8 In fact, although litigation has increased in re-
cent decades far more quickly in the federal than in the state
courts, fewer than 2 percent of all civil cases are filed in federal
court, 9 and fewer than 3 percent of our nation's judges are Article
III judges.70
What this small portion of adjudicators should do is a painful
but critical question. The question is intensely political (not in any
pejorative sense), as it has been ever since the original debates be-
tween the Federalists and anti-Federalists about the reach of fed-
eral court jurisdiction. The scope of federal judicial power is most
heatedly debated when federal courts require school busing, the re-
apportionment of legislatures, or structural changes in state pris-
ons or mental hospitals. Whatever the merits of particular deci-
sions in these areas, there is, I think, a strong case for using the
scarce commodity of Article III justice to protect constitutional
and other federal rights likely to be asserted by disfavored persons.
I recognize that from one view this argument begs the question.
Tenure and salary protection is not required as a matter of due
process,71 and it might make judges not apolitical but, rather, au-
tonomously political.72 Our attitudes about judicial review incorpo-
rate an inescapable contradiction between the desire for judicial
independence and the fear of unaccountable power.73 One for
whom the latter consideration weighs more heavily might prefer
having state judges, who tend to be more accountable, deciding
constitutional cases. The point is not merely theoretical; recall the
Norris-LaGuardia Act,74 the Johnson Act of 1934,7" and the Tax
48 See Warren, 37 Harv L Rev at 109 (cited in note 6).
e' Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 Md L Rev 3, 6, 15
(1986).
70 Paul M. Bator, The Federal Judicial System, in Leonard W. Levy, Kenneth L. Karst
and Dennis Mahoney, eds, 3 Encyclopedia of the American Constitution 1068, 1073 (Mac-
Millan, 1986).
71 But see Martin H. Redish and Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence
and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 Yale L J 455, 504 (1986).
72 See Posner, The Federal Courts at 16 (cited in note 15).
73 See Louis Michael Seidman, Ambivalence and Accountability, 61 S Cal L Rev 1571
(1988).
74 29 USC §§ 101-15 (1982).
7-6 28 USC § 1342 (1982).
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Injunction Act,76 all of which were motivated in part by a desire to
limit the power of Article III courts to render broad constitutional
rulings. 77 My own view, nonetheless, is that the concern about judi-
cial independence is the more pressing one-a view shared by such
diverse observers as Professor Neuborne and Judge Posner.7
But questions important to the federal courts' role lie far
outside the rarified air of constitutional adjudication. Has the time
finally come, if not for abolition, at least for serious curtailment of
diversity jurisdiction? Although last year Congress increased the
jurisdictional amount from $10,000 to $50,000,7" that tightening
will almost surely be neutralized by the imagination of those who
draft ad damnum clauses. But if the political obstacles can be sur-
mounted, additional limitations, such as barring invocation of di-
versity jurisdiction by citizens of the state of suit or by corpora-
tions with a substantial connection there, would also be welcome.80
Beyond diversity cases, aren't there sets of federal question
cases-for example FELA cases and recovery of unpaid federal
loans or excess federal benefits-that could be routed exclusively
to state courts? Does it make sense to provide an individualized
right to judicial review of (virtually) every adverse determination
by the Social Security Administration? Should some screening de-
vice be instituted in prisoner cases?8" In answering these questions,
history may offer some useful perspective: we have departed very
far from the First Judiciary Act's structure, which encompassed no
general federal question jurisdiction at all; nothing would stop
some modest moves back in that direction.
In the end, though, there are practical limits to what can be
78 28 USC § 1341 (1982).
77 See Johnson Act, S Rep No 125, 73d Cong, 1st Sess 4-5, 8-9 (1934); Tax Injunction
Act, S Rep No 1035, 75th Cong, 1st Sess 2 (1937) (Tax Injunction Act modeled on Johnson
Act); Felix Frankfurter and Nathan Greene, The Labor Injunction 212-20 (MacMillan,
1930) (Norris-LaGuardia Act).
11 See Posner, The Federal Courts at 21, 180 (cited in note 15); Burt Neuborne, The
Myth of Parity, 90 Harv L Rev 1105, 1127-28 (1977).
" Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub L No 100-702 § 201, 102 Stat
4642, 4646 (1988).
so See ALI, Study at 12-14, 123-33 (cited in note 65). See also David L. Shapiro, Fed-
eral Diversity Jurisdiction: A Survey and a Proposal, 91 Harv L Rev 317, 339-55 (1977)
(arguing that the benefits and burdens of diversity jurisdiction vary across regions, and pro-
posing that each judicial district be empowered to decide whether to curtail or abolish the
jurisdiction within that district).
8' Federal law does require exhaustion of administrative remedies in limited circum-
stances, see 42 USC § 1997e (1982), but this provision has had little impact. See Hart &
Wechsler at 1352-53 (cited in note 4).
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accomplished by jurisdictional trimming. Institutions develop a life
of their own, one that resists efforts to turn back the clock. In-
creased staffs, increased dockets, and the role of judge as manager
(of the conduct of individual lawsuits, of staff, and of the increased
dockets and flow of paper) are probably here to stay. Most discus-
sions of these phenomena are lamentations coupled with expres-
sions of hope that some set of reforms can recapture the good old
days. 2 I suspect that we also must accept the present, and strive to
formulate a new set of understandings that accommodate the
changing realities of judicial administration.
History teaches another lesson worth noting here: changes in
the federal judicial system are unlikely to occur quickly and deci-
sively. Compared to the early days Congress is now more active, 3
but ordinarily it has not been very attentive to legislation concern-
ing the judiciary. It took nearly eighty years for Congress to relieve
the Justices of their circuit riding duties.84 Thereafter, widespread
recognition of the inadequacy of the original judicial structure did
not give rise to legislative reform until 189185-by which point the
time between docketing and argument in the Supreme Court had
reached three years.8 6 More recently, heated controversies about
the role of the federal courts in habeas corpus and in civil rights
actions have produced relatively little response from Congress.8 7
Last year's elimination of the Supreme Court's mandatory jurisdic-
tion and increase in the jurisdictional amount in diversity cases
may be more hopeful signs, 8 but overall, here as elsewhere "[i]t is
easier to accept situational pressures toward drift or inertia than to
labor to formulate issues and muster support of interested parties
82 See, for example, Antonin Scalia, An Address by Justice Antonin Scalia, United
States Supreme Court, 34 Fed Bar News & J 252 (1987).
83 Charles Warren notes that for forty-five years the structure of the First Judiciary Act
remained unchanged. See Warren, 37 Harv L Rev at 131 (cited in note 6).
84 See Act of April 10, 1869, ch 22, 16 Stat 44. I put to one side the relief provided for
just over twelve months by the "Midnight Judges Act." See Act of Feb 13, 1801, ch 4, 2 Stat
89, repealed by Act of Mar 8, 1802, ch 8, § 1, 2 Stat 132.
85 See Hart & Wechsler at 36-37 (cited in note 4).
88 See Rehnquist, 14 Fla St U L Rev at 6 (cited in note 44).
87 There are a few recent enactments dealing with such matters. See, for example, the
1966 legislation, now codified at 28 USC § 2254(d) (1982), presumptively requiring deference
in federal habeas corpus actions to state court factfinding; the 1976 legislation providing for
attorneys fees for prevailing plaintiffs in federal civil rights actions, see 42 USC § 1988
(1982); and legislation relating to exhaustion of administrative remedies in prisoner suits,
see 42 USC § 1997e (1982) (discussed in note 82).
88 Pub L No 100-352, 102 Stat 662 (1988); Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice
Act § 201, 102 Stat 4669 (1988).
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to get a bill drawn and pressed to passage. '89
5. FEDERALISM AND CHOICE OF LAW
A final question is of a quite different order: does the complex-
ity of choice of law questions in this country impair the effective-
ness of law as a regulatory system? Judge Friendly's paean to Erie
v Tompkins and the new federal common law as concepts "so
beautifully simple, and so simply beautiful" 90 would bring some
combination of amusement and fury to many law students or prac-
ticing lawyers trying to determine whether state or federal law ap-
plies. At least as vexing are the choice of law questions that arise
when more than one state has some relationship to a controversy.
Modern conflicts doctrine, for all (or perhaps because) of its pur-
posive refinement, has proved notoriously indeterminate. 9' Indeed,
the very problems that Erie was designed to avoid-forum shop-
ping, unfairness, and uncertainty about the rules governing pri-
mary conduct-may all be present in horizontal choice of law
settings.
Justice Jackson put the problem well in 1945:
[T]oday in respect of our legal administrations we have not
achieved a much "more perfect union" than that of the colo-
nies under the Articles of Confederation. We have so far as I
can ascertain the most localized and conflicting system of any
country which presents the external appearance of na-
tionhood. But we are so accustomed to the delays, expense,
and frustrations of our system that it seldom occurs to us to
inquire whether these are wise, or constitutionally necessary.92
The growth in the post-War period of nationwide institutions and
of interstate travel and communication makes his comments even
more apt today.
Justice Jackson's concerns obviously implicate not only the
federal judicial system, but also the state courts and, most broadly,
the federal structure of government. Still, the problem of choice of
law may be particularly visible in some cases in the federal courts.
89 James Willard Hurst, Legal Elements in United States History, in Donald Fleming
and Bernard Bailyn, eds, 5 Law in American History 3, 30 (Harvard, 1971).
10 See Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39
NYU L Rev 383, 422 (1964).
91 See Herma Hill Kay, Theory into Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 34 Mercer
L Rev 521, 522-23, 585-86 (1983).
92 Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitu-
tion, 45 Colum L Rev 1, 18 (1945).
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Mass tort proceedings under the federal multidistrict rules provide
a notable example of the potential complexities. The so-called
"transferee" federal district court, hearing a group of consolidated
cases, is obliged to apply in each case the choice of law doctrine
that would have been applied by the "transferor" federal
court-the court in which that case was originally filed.93 Under
Klaxon Co. v Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 4 the transferor
federal court would have applied the conflicts doctrine of the state
in which it sits. In so complex a regime, mistakes-which are noth-
ing more than disagreements between a federal district court and a
federal court of appeals about the meaning of some state's choice
of law rules-are easy to make9" and can be costly to undo.
It is tempting to blame the Klaxon decision for these complex-
ities, but they arise more fundamentally from the very existence of
diverse state substantive law and choice of law rules. While Klaxon
may lead to application of different substantive rules of law if suit
is filed in one federal district court rather than another, an anti-
Klaxon regime (under which federal courts would apply federal
judge-made choice of law rules to state law claims) might lead to
application of different substantive rules if suit is filed in federal
rather than state court. Whether one kind of disuniformity is more
troubling than another is a complicated empirical question.96 In
mass tort cases, given the difficulties of applying the conflicts rules
of multiple states, the balance of convenience may favor a federal
choice of law rule;97 in other cases, the balance is far less clear.
In the end, however, neither a Klaxon nor an anti-Klaxon re-
gime can eliminate all uncertainties about which law governs mul-
tistate transactions. These uncertainties inhere in the very federal
structure of a republic with multiple loci of lawmaking responsibil-
9' See Van Dusen v Barrack, 376 US 612, 639 (1964); Barbara Ann Atwood, The
Choice-of-law Dilemma in Mass Tort Litigation: Kicking Around Erie, Klaxon, and Van
Dusen, 19 Conn L Rev 9, 11-12 (1986).
" 313 US 487 (1941).
See, for example, In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, 644 F2d 594 (7th Cir 1981)
(reviewing the district court's analysis of the choice of law rules for six different jurisdic-
tions, and ruling that in five of the six cases the district court had misapplied them). For a
suggestion that the Seventh Circuit's analysis itself was mistaken, and may have been influ-
enced by a desire to avoid having different claims governed by different substantive rules
regarding the availability of punitive damages, see Atwood, 19 Conn L Rev at 28 n 96 (cited
in note 94).
11 See John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 Harv L Rev 693, 714-15 n 125
(1974).
11 See, for example, American Law Institute, Complex Litigation Project: Council
Draft No.1 250-67 (November 23, 1988); Atwood, 19 Conn L Rev at 43-45, 47-51 (cited in
note 94).
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ity-for both choice of law rules and substantive rules of decision.
And these uncertainties have grown as modern technology has
made multistate controversies more common, while long arm stat-
utes provide access to multiple fora whose conflicts doctrines may
generate different outcomes.
What is needed, I believe, is a single set of uniform federal
choice of law rules, binding in the state as well as the federal
courts." The existence of multiple, conflicting choice of law rules is
not-to harken back to Justice Jackson-either "wise, or constitu-
tionally necessary." The point is not simply that uniform federal
choice of law rules, and only such rules, will prevent choice of fo-
rum from influencing choice of law. It is also that federal law pro-
vides an appropriate source of neutral rules to select the governing
law in disputes implicating more than one state.
What might the role of the federal judiciary be in the develop-
ment of such choice of law rules? Doubts have been raised about
the appropriateness of fashioning such rules as federal common
law,99 and in any event both the force of precedent and the current
Court's narrow view of federal common law make such a develop-
ment unlikely. Moreover, because choice of law doctrine lacks pre-
dictability even within a single jurisdiction, 00 Congressional enact-
ment of some basic rules and principles would provide a welcome
starting point.10 The primary role of the federal courts might lie
less in launching the enterprise and more in trying to keep it on
course. The exposition of a uniform body of federal choice of law
rules would occur, of course, in state as well as federal courts. But
here as elsewhere, federal courts, though handling only a small
fraction of such questions, could be expected to exercise a leader-
ship role.0 2 In doing so, they would be playing the structural role
98 See William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 Stan L Rev 1
(1963); Harold W. Horowitz, Toward a Federal Common Law of Choice of Law, 14 UCLA L
Rev 1191 (1967). See also Donald T. Trautman, The Relation Between American Choice of
Law and Federal Common Law, 41 Law & Contemp Prob 105, 114-26 (Spring 1977).
99 Compare Ely, 87 Harv L Rev at 714-15 n 125 (cited in note 97) (arguing that the
Rules of Decision Act, 28 USC § 1652 (1982), requires federal courts to follow the Klaxon
approach to conflicts questions involving state law claims), with Hart, 54 Colum L Rev at
515 (cited in note 58), and Atwood, 19 Conn L Rev at 46 & nn 178-79 (cited in note 94)
(both noting that the Act requires adherence to state rules only "in cases to which they
apply.") For arguments that there is federal authority to generate "real" federal choice of
law rules binding in the state courts, see Baxter, 16 Stan L Rev at 22-42 (cited in note 99);
Horowitz, 14 UCLA L Rev at 1203-05 (cited in note 99); Trautman, 41 Law & Contemp
Probs at 114-17 (cited in note 99).
100 See ALI, Project at 254 (Reporter's Notes to Comment A) (cited in note 98).
101 On the scope of congressional power, see ALI, Project at 259-65 (cited in note 98).
102 See generally Hart, 54 Colum L Rev at 513-15 (cited in note 58). Adoption of such a
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originally given to the national judiciary in 1789-to serve as a
neutral arbiter within the federal system.10 3
There remains a final problem of uncertainty in a federal sys-
tem that choice of law rules alone cannot solve. The simple facts
that different states have different substantive rules, and that
many courses of conduct touch more than one state, generate un-
certainty about what law governs. States are unlikely to extend the
approach of the Uniform Commercial Code to other areas of law.
Substantive uniformity is likely to be forthcoming, if at all, only
through the formulation of federal rules of decision, again presum-
ably by Congress.
More than tradition cautions against even limited experimen-
tation with federal lawmaking in areas for which the states have
heretofore held primary, if not exclusive, responsibility. To the ob-
vious fear of federal intrusion must be added other concerns. Codi-
fication is difficult work even when undertaken by experts who are
free, if not of political opinions, at least of the cruder kinds of po-
litical pressures that accompany American electoral democracy.
Delegation to "experts" raises its own political problems, as high-
lighted by controversy (here I mean political rather than constitu-
tional) over the existence and recommendations of the United
States Sentencing Commission. Finally, nationally imposed uni-
formity might stifle the creativity and experimentation that a fed-
eral system is said to promote.104
But from another vantage point, creation of uniform federal
substantive rules is itself a form of experimentation, whose distinc-
tive advantages-simplicity and provision of clearer guidance to
primary actors-might outweigh the drawbacks just noted. The
problems faced by national or multinational institutions con-
ducting affairs in fifty states were just not on the agenda in 1789.
Perhaps in an era in which the European Community is striving,
experimentally, for greater harmonization of the laws of member
proposal might provide one reason for retaining some portion of the diversity jurisdic-
tion-to permit discharge of the leadership role just noted. In any event, federal courts hear
state law issues under other grants of jurisdiction-for example, as defenses to federal
causes of action or under pendent or ancillary jurisdiction.
1 See Baxter, 16 Stan L Rev at 22-23, 33 (cited in note 99); See also Hart, 54 Colum L
Rev at 514 n 85 (cited in note 58).
104 New State Ice Co. v Liebmann, 285 US 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis dissenting). A
final question is whether such cases could be filed in federal court; if so, the burdens on the
federal judiciary would be correspondingly increased; if not, serious difficulties in ensuring
that these uniform laws remain uniform might arise. One possibility would be to make the
cases triable in state court, but with some authority to certify issues to federal appellate
courts to help promote consistent interpretation.
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states, we too should be willing to undertake similar experiments,
at least in selected areas. (One example would be a federal tort law
governing the liability of drug manufacturers, whose commerce
tends to be nationwide and who are already subject to a regime of
federal regulation, with which private tort remedies might appro-
priately be integrated.)
I suggest consideration of even limited nationalization of sub-
stantive law hesitantly, for it raises a set of prodigious difficulties,
on which I have touched only briefly. But it is worth recalling that
over our history, attitudes about the nature and sources of legal
rules have changed a good deal. The conception of the general
common law reflected in the First Judiciary Act's famous § 34-as
a body of law transcending any particular jurisdiction' 0 5 -was ex-
ploded by Erie and by the writings of the realists. 0 6 But the famil-
iarity of our modern view that decisional law and statutory law
alike are purposive instruments of each state should not prevent us
from asking whether fifty state laws always constitute, collectively,
an effective instrument of national policy. Diversity and uniformity
both have attractions. The decision how far to favor one at the
expense of the other cannot be drawn for all time; an approach
that made sense in 1789 or 1938 may serve our purposes less well
in the year 2000. At some point, we might decide that Justice
Story's aspiration for uniformity in Swift v Tyson speaks to pre-
sent needs.
Even on an occasion celebrating the First Judiciary Act, it is
hard to agree with Justice Brown that that piece of legislation was
probably "the most satisfactory Act ever passed by Congress.' ' 0 7 It
is far easier to accept the view Frankfurter and Landis expressed
in 1928, that "changes in the future are likely to be more rapid
than they have been in the past."'0 8 An equally safe prophecy is
that the federal judiciary will remain a subject of controversy,
drawing condemnation and praise just as it did at its inception. 0 9
Those of us who labor in the vineyard of federal jurisdiction
100 See William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judici-
ary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 Harv L Rev 1513, 1517-21 (1984).
106 See Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story, 102 Harv L Rev 688, 695 (1989); Hart, 54 Colum
L Rev at 512 (cited in note 58).
107 Henry B. Brown, The New Federal Judicial Code, 36 ABA Rep 339, 345, (1911),
quoted in Warren, 37 Harv L Rev at 52 (cited in note 6).
10 Frankfurter and Landis, Business of the Supreme Court at 1 (cited in note 9).
109 See Warren, 37 Harv L Rev at 52-53 (cited in note 6).
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find it a rich one, whose best product is complex but at times sub-
tle and invigorating. We can only hope that, like the finest prod-
ucts of other vineyards, it will improve with age.

